主题：Know Thy Enemy: Information Acquisition in Contests

主讲：陈倬琼，哈尔滨工业大学（深圳）经济管理学院

时间：2022年5月12日12:30--14:00

地点：腾讯会议735-157-030

报告摘要：

This paper studies the incentives for and the consequences of information acquisition about opponents in contests with independent private values. Two players can spy on each other by privately acquiring a costly, noisy, and private signal about the opponent's value by choosing the signal's accuracy before the contest. Given that they spy on each other, we characterize the unique monotonic equilibrium in the contest whenever it exists. The players may not have the incentives to acquire information when they do not observe each other's accuracies of signals, and always have the incentives when they do observe the accuracies. Acquiring information about opponents may lead to allocative inefficiency but always benefits both players even accounting for its costs.

主讲人简介：

陈倬琼，哈尔滨工业大学（深圳）经济管理学院助理教授，毕业于伦敦政治经济学院，此前获得北京大学经济学硕士、香港大学金融学硕士学位。主要研究方向是应用博弈论、行为经济学、数字经济学，研究见于European Economic Review, Journal of Mathematical Economics等。