讲座题目：Robust Auctions for Selling Multiple Goods（销售多种商品的稳健拍卖机制）

主讲人：张万昌 香港中文大学（深圳）

讲座时间：2025年11月24日14:00

讲座地点：学院229

讲座内容摘要：

I study a mechanism design problem for selling multiple goods to multiple bidders under minimal informational assumptions. Specifically, I assume the designer only knows upper bounds on bidders’ values for each good, with no additional distributional information. Adopting a minimax regret approach, I define the expected regret of a mechanism, given a joint distribution over value profiles and an equilibrium, as the difference between the full surplus and the expected revenue. The designer aims to find a minimax regret mechanism——one that minimizes the worst-case expected regret across all possible joint distributions and equilibria. I show that a separate second-price auction with random reserves achieves this objective for general upper bounds. In this mechanism, the designer conducts independent auctions for each good, with each auction being a second-price auction with random reserves.

研究的主要内容是在最小信息假设下向多个投标人销售多种商品的机制设计问题。具体而言，假设设计者仅知道投标人对每件商品价值的估值上限，而不掌握任何额外的分布信息。采用最小化最大遗憾的方法，研究者将给定价值剖面联合分布和均衡状态下机制的期望遗憾定义为总剩余与期望收益之差。设计者的目标是找到最小化最大遗憾的机制——即在所有可能的联合分布和均衡中，使最坏情况下的期望遗憾最小化的机制。研究证明了对于一般估值上限情况，采用随机保留价的独立二价拍卖能够实现这一目标。在该机制中，设计者为每件商品独立举行二价拍卖，且每个拍卖均设有随机保留价。

主讲人学术简介：

Wanchang Zhang received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of California, San Diego. He previously earned a Master’s degree in Economics from Kyoto University and a Bachelor’s degree in Economics from Xiamen University. His research focuses on microeconomic theory, particularly mechanism design and information design. His job market paper is currently under revise & resubmit at the American Economic Review.

张万昌，香港中文大学（深圳）经管学院助理教授，博士毕业于加州大学圣地亚哥分校经济学专业，此前曾获京都大学经济学硕士学位及厦门大学经济学学士学位。研究聚焦于微观经济理论，尤其是机制设计与信息设计领域，一篇研究论文目前正处于《美国经济评论》的返修阶段。