【Abstract】 This paper considers a complete bipartite conflict network model with returns to scale technology. We show that the impact of the returns to scale technology on agents’ equilibrium behaviors can be determined by two important factors: the size ratio of two coalitions and the degree of local interdependencies of conflicts. We find an inverted U relationship between the returns to scale technology and (individual and total) equilibrium efforts when two coalitions differ sufficiently in size and the degree of local interdependencies of conflicts is high. Our finding suggests that an increase in the returns to scale technology can be beneficial in the sense that it reduces conflict intensity.
【Keywords】 Conflict network game; Local interdependency; Returns to scale technology; Tullock contest
本文于2019年5月在线发表于Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization，第163卷。该期刊为学院A- 类奖励期刊，本文作者按姓氏字母排序。
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